WHAT ARE THE SECURITY AND DEFENCE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UK OF MELTING ARCTIC ICE?

  1. There is nomor immediate ‘hard’ security threat to the UK from Arctic change. However, the developments associated with Arctic change do pose a range of security plus defence considerations for the UK. These come in the form of:

 ‘Hard plus ‘soft’ security issues which directly affect the UK;

 The need to re-evaluate UK provision, training plus strategic priorities in key areas.

  1. Fisheries – Arctic warming has contributed to a rise in northern sea temperatures, impacting marine ecosystems well beyond the Arctic Ocean. Fish stocks plus fish migration patterns already appear to be affected. As a greater tempat of the central Arctic Ocean remains ice-free for longer periods, we are likely to see the northward migration of commercially harvested fish species. New fishing opportunities will attract both sanctioned plus ‘rogue’ fishing vessels, something which may lift safety, political plus security implications.
  2. The post-Brexit settlement may see the UK government assuming full responsibility for fisheries in its exclusive economic zone. A simak of current fisheries protection arrangements may be required to ensure satisfactory enforcement of a UK ‘exclusion zone’.
  3. Maritime search plus rescue – Arctic change has prompted a rise in shipping traffic in plus across northern seas, in keeping with industrial growth. Recent years have seen a rapid rise of tourism in the Arctic, with the prospect of very large passenger ships sailing to, plus in, Arctic waters. The lack of maritime safety plus support infrastructure in Arctic waters is widely regarded as a cause for concern. The UK must consider how well it is prepared to deal with the various maritime security issues thrown up by Arctic change plus how far its approach is compatible with that of key Arctic allies.
  4. In 2015, the House of Lords Select Committee on the Arctic (henceforth, HOLSCA) undertook a rigorous assessment of the UK’s approach to Arctic affairs in a report entitled Responding to a changing Arctic. The report criticised the UK’s approach to maritime safety in northern waters, urging that the UK government address deficiencies as a matter of priority.
  5. HOLSCA noted that the loss of the UK’s maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) following the 2010 Strategic Defence plus Security Review (henceforth SDSR) had reduced the UK’s ability to support Iceland plus Denmark in northern search-and-rescue (S&R) activities, plus left Norway to patrol a section of the North Sea that is the UK’s responsibility.
  6. The 2015 SDSR announced the procurement of 9 Poseidon P-8 MPA from the US. Delivery of the first aircraft is scheduled for 2019. The UK government should do everything possible to ensure there is nomor production-time overrun on these aircraft. Given the time-period until operational effectiveness, plus given the possibility of overruns, the UK government might consider leasing appropriate aircraft in the interim period.
  7. This is a hugely important issue for the UK, both operationally plus symbolically. The UK is an important transatlantic player plus must show that it can look after its own backyard. The UK must provision itself properly plus increase cooperation on these issues with Arctic neighbours to show that it is a serious plus reliable partner.
  8. Environmental security – Increases in maritime traffic, energy industry development, oil industry decommissioning projects plus military developments can hardly fail to have environmental implications for the UK. Increased shipping traffic will likely prompt an increase in chemical plus plastic litter pollution, incidents involving vessels carrying dangerous cargo, plus species invasion arising from ballast water evacuations plus hull-borne transfers. Major oil spills plus nuclear accidents – possibly involving military assets – represent major hazards.
  9. Distinctive Scottish interests – Scotland may have particular interest in ensuring that there is an optimal UK strategy for dealing with environmental security plus maritime safety in northern waters:

 With 60% of the UK’s sea tempat plus around 61% of its coastline, Scotland has considerable socio-economic interests vested in the maritime sphere;

 The closest part of the UK to the Arctic, Scotland is the most directly exposed of all the nations of the UK to maritime accidents in this region;

 Pollution arising from maritime accidents in northern waters would likely have the most immediate – plus greatest – impact upon Scotland;

 Scotland is the closest part of the UK to the northern shipping routes plus its harbours will often be the closest ‘safe havens’ for ships in distress;

 Scottish-based vessels will often be the primary responders to accidents, supported by Scottish port authorities plus agencies.

  1. Northern Scotland is the most logical ‘launch-pad’ for UK participation in maritime safety plus S&R operations in northern waters. The UK government should ensure that adequate resources are in place to support effective S&R operations plus pollution control activities, notably oil spills. These should be optimally located in Scotland. The UK government should also offer a far clearer expression of how the UK’s military assets might assist in various civil security challenges such as accidents in the Arctic plus sub-Arctic regions. Developing what is required may demand significant investment on the part of the UK government but this is necessary to keep pace with change across the northern maritime sphere. As HOLSCA’s 2015 report acknowledged, demonstrating an authentic commitment on this front is necessary if the UK is to present itself ‘as a premier partner in the Arctic’.
  2. Alliance commitments plus military training – The increasing focus on Arctic security has impacted – plus will continue to impact – upon the UK’s training plus alliance commitments. For example, the Royal Navy is now working to re-generate the Submarine Service’s ‘under ice capability’ in anticipation of greater deployment in the Arctic. Last year, UK Royal Marines – for the first time – trained US Marines in Arctic warfare as the US military seeks to bolster its own proficiency in this sphere.
  3. Terrorism – as Arctic tourism develops, plus given that some tourist vessels lift several thousand passengers, a terrorist incident cannot be ruled out as radical individuals plus groups look to new arenas to cause damage plus create headlines. Tourists are often targeted by terrorists. There is nomor reason to assume that Arctic tourists would not be targeted. The UK government should consider how prepared it is to deal with such a scenario.
  4. Russian military activity – The most obvious (and publicly known) ‘hard’ threat to the UK from an evolving Arctic security agenda is the marked increase in Russian submarine patrols operating out of the Arctic plus into the North Atlantic.

In 2013, the Russian Navy announced that it was making the Arctic ‘a priority’ plus there has been heavy investment in its Northern Fleet which operates out of Murmansk. The Northern Fleet is the home of Russia’s submarine-based nuclear deterrent; this has been supplied with new nuclear-powered submarines with can lift intercontinental nuclear missiles. Russian submarine patrols have recently occurred at levels not seen since the Cold War. Russian aerial activity around, plus into, UK airspace has also increased during the same period.

  1. Russian submarine activity appears to be particularly focused on Scotland’s west coast. It is widely assumed that this activity is aimed at recording the acoustic signatures of the UK’s nuclear-armed submarines as they leave the Faslane naval base.
  2. It is also thought that Russian submarines plus spy ships are seeking to locate transatlantic undersea cables in the waters around the UK. These connections – which lift almost all world internet communications – can be eavesdropped, thus allowing penting knowledge to be gleaned. Cutting these cables could cause huge damage to economic markets plus interrupt social communications.
  3. As well as representing a clear challenge to the UK’s national security, increased Russian naval activity may also lift maritime safety plus environmental risks. Submarine activity may have especially serious implications given its covert nature; the risk posed to fishing vessels has long been recognised.
  4. These developments demand a leading role from the UK, not only for reasons of its own national security but as a leading NATO member which is central to the transatlantic security agenda. However, its ability to fulfil this role remains open to question. The UK currently relies upon NATO allies’ MPA to search for Russian subs in UK waters. Whilst some would argue that this is what ‘alliance’ means, it is not a satisfactory arrangement for the UK.
  5. As UK allies mount their own domestic operations plus face demands to meet other commitments such as policing the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean, it is possible that allied MPA cover for the UK will fall short.
  6. The US Navy returned to the Keflavik air force base in Iceland in 2016, having left the facility in 2006. This development will see American MPA operating submarine monitoring operations across the Arctic plus North Atlantic. It is possible that this might in part ‘cover the gap’ until the first arrival of the UK’s P8s in 2019. However, this cannot be guaranteed.
  7. Re-establishing the UK’s MPA capability to its fullness is a priority. However, it has been observed that the UK’s new P-8s are not compatible with RAF mid-air refuelling aircraft, drastically reducing their range. If this is so, plus it is deemed to be operationally problematic, then the UK government must address this issue as quickly plus decisively as possible.
  8. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) is also coming under very public criticism over the size, operability plus future structure of the Royal Navy’s surface fleet. The House of Commons Defence Committee recently declared that the UK has a “woefully low” number of available vessels. Ongoing power-generation problems affecting the Type 45 destroyers are damaging to the Royal Navy; all six of these warships require substantial repairs which will take them out of operation, one at a time, from 2019. The government’s modernisation plans for the Navy fleet have also come under fire.
  9. I am not sufficiently knowledgeable to comment on precisely what the Royal Navy needs plus how the MoD should address its critics on its naval strategy. However, there seems to be a growing consensus that the surface fleet is too thinly stretched, raising questions over how far a more vigorous northerly posture can be mounted by the Royal Navy whilst maintaining current commitments.
  10. A more visible naval presence in Scotland? As long as Russian naval activity continues as it has, demands will continue for a ‘major’ Royal Navy surface vessel to be based in Scotland. UK Ministers have repeatedly denied the need to base a warship in Scotland despite the fact that under current arrangements, notification of a Russian naval surface vessel entering the UK’s northern waters (not an infrequent occurrence) typically prompts the deployment of a frigate from Portsmouth on a 600-mile journey to intercept the vessel in question. This ‘scramble’ can take 24 hours. Given the value which is consistently placed upon visible military posturing in the relationship between Russia plus the west, legitimate questions might be asked of whether this arrangement sends the right message about UK defence preparedness, plus whether Scotland is overly exposed to Russian activity in the northern maritime space.
  11. The UK government has announced that the Royal Navy’s entire submarine fleet will be based at the Faslane naval base by 2020. This move can be viewed as placing the UK’s submarines on a more northerly footing. It may or may not address concerns over the perceived lack of a ‘hard’ Royal Navy surface presence in Scotland.
  12. DO UK ARMED FORCES HAVE THE NECESSARY NUMBERS, TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT TO OPERATE EFECTIVELY IN THE ARCTIC IF NEEDED?
  13. Whilst the UK has a clear obligation to address Russian activity out of the Arctic, the UK’s security commitment to the Arctic region itself is a different story. With nomor sovereign territory to defend there, the UK is not obligated to build its Arctic military capabilities as are the Arctic nations. Even before the austerity-driven 2010 SDSR, the UK had a low-level physical presence in the Arctic. Since then, there has been a reduction in the UK military’s cold-weather warfare training. The loss of MPA capability has left the UK ‘blind in the Arctic’ plus unable to assist its Arctic neighbours in a variety of tasks.
  14. HOLSCA’s 2015 report urges that this situation be addressed. It asserts that that the UK government must develop its capability ‘to support policing in the Arctic high seas area’ plus advises the MoD to ‘maintain plus develop its cold-weather operational capabilities, expertise plus resources’.
  15. The UK government should act on these – plus other – HOLSCA recommendations. However, it should do so cautiously. As far as bolstering the UK’s Arctic military capabilities are concerned, any such commitment must surely be underpinned by clearly stated strategic rationales. However, the Arctic is notably absent recent UK security plus defence proclamations:

 The Arctic wasn’t mentioned in the UK government’s 2010 SDSR or in its 2010 National Security Strategy;

 The UK’s 2013 Arctic Policy Framework touches only lightly on military issues; it acknowledges NATO’s potential Arctic role (something most Arctic strategy papers have avoided) but neglects to address how the UK military might assist in various civil security challenges such as accidents in the Arctic;

 The UK government’s 2014 National Strategy for Maritime Security acknowledges that the opening of Arctic shipping routes presents the UK with potential new maritime security threats but neglects to go into any detail;

 The Arctic did not feature at all in the 2015 SDSR.

  1. This raises an important question: if the Arctic has such minor visibility in the UK’s security strategies, can strengthening the UK’s Arctic capabilities really be justified?